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Title VII of the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978: A "Perfect" Order?
By JUSTIN C. SMITH*
CRAIG PAUL WOOD**
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 19781 (Reform Act),
passed by Congress on October 13, 1978, provides federal employees
2
with significantly greater access to final and binding arbitration than
they have ever known.3 In the preamble to Title VII of the Reform
Act,4 Congress acknowledged the importance of protecting "the right of
federal employees to organize, to bargain collectively, and to partici-
pate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions
which affect them' 5 while "safeguard[ing] the public interest [and] con-
tribut[ing] to the effective conduct of public business .... -6 Thus,
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. B.S., 1950, Lawrence College; J.D.,
1954, LL.M., 1959, University of Wisconsin. Arbitrator-Labor Panel American Arbitration
Association; Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service; California Public Employment
Relations Board.
** A.B., 1974, University of California at Berkeley; M.A., 1975, Northwestern Univer-
sity. Member, Third Year Class.
I. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1192 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (Supp.
II. 1978) (effective January 11, 1979) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-
1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976) (as amended)).
2. The term "federal employees" does not include postal employees. Collective bar-
gaining agreements of postal employees are negotiated under the authority of the Postal
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 735 (1970) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 1206
(1976)).
3. In this Article, final and binding arbitration refers to grievance arbitration. A
grievance is defined at 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9) (Supp. 11 1978) as "any complaint-
(A) by any employee concerning any matter relating to the employment of the em-
ployee;
(B) by any labor organization concerning any matter relating to the employment of
any employee; or
(C) by any employee, labor organization, or agency concerning-
(i) the effect or interpretation, or any claim of breach, of a collective bargaining
agreement; or
(ii) any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rate,
or regulation affecting conditions of employment."
4. 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (Supp. I 1978).
5. Id. § 7101(a)(1).
6. Id. § 7101(a)(1)(A),(B).
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Congress recognized that advances taken to enhance working condi-
tions are necessarily limited by the need for government to serve its
citizens. As finally written, the Reform Act serves labor and manage-
ment interests equally well.
Prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, federal sector labor-
management relations were governed by executive order. The Reform
Act serves to codify "policies, regulations, and procedures established
under and decisions issued under" the executive orders,7 except as
modified or revoked either by the Reform Act itself or by orders and
decisions issued under its authority. The Reform Act therefore repre-
sents the culmination of eighteen years of experience during which ar-
bitration rose in importance both as a means of resolving disputes and
as a tool of collective bargaining.
This Article reviews federal sector arbitration, focusing on several
aspects of arbitration. First, developments that occurred under the ex-
ecutive orders are discussed as an aid to understanding the effect of the
Reform Act, with an emphasis on the increased accessibility of arbitra-
tion. Second, the Article discusses the arbitration process itself, includ-
ing necessary qualities of an arbitrator, arbitration procedures,
standards of contract interpretation, and the precedential or authorita-
tive value of arbitration awards. Third, administrative and judicial re-
view of arbitration awards as practiced under the executive orders and
as incorporated by the Reform Act are discussed to determine the true
scope of "final and binding" arbitration.
Finally, by an analysis of the Reform Act itself, this Article seeks
to demonstrate that the Act is not free from flaws. Thus, while this
Article does not propose changes that the Reform Act could have insti-
tuted, it does identify certain questions that remain unanswered and
proposes answers to those questions.
History and Scope of Arbitration Under the Executive Orders
A basic principle of both labor law and labor relations holds that
one may grieve only what one may bargain. This principle derives
from the limitation on the scope of an arbitrator's authority to interpret
and apply a collective bargaining agreement. 8 What may be bargained
is in turn limited by those rights expressly reserved to management. 9
7. Id. § 7135.
8. For a discussion of the scope of the arbitrator's authority, see text accompanying
notes 72-77 infra.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (Supp. 111978) sets out those rights that are specifically reserved
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Throughout the history of grievance arbitration in the federal sector,
the executive orders and presently the Reform Act have expressly ex-
cepted certain matters from the negotiation of the agreement.' 0 Most
notably, and in direct contrast to public state and local sectors and the
private sector, the reservation to management of the right to determine
an agency's budget" serves to preclude labor organizations from nego-
tiating employee wages. Thus, what remains for negotiation in the fed-
eral sector are "conditions of employment," 12 which the Reform Act
to management: "Subject to subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall affect
the authority of any management official of any agency-
(1) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal
security practices of the agency; and
(2) in accordance with applicable laws-:-
(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff and retain employees in the agency, or to sus-
pend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or to take other disciplinary action against such em-
ployees;
(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to
determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted;
(C) with respect to filing positions, to make selections for appointments from-
(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or
(ii) any other appropriate source; and
(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission
during emergencies."
Subsection (b) provides that no right retained by management shall preclude any
agency and any labor organization from negotiating, at the election of the agency, matters
more directly pertaining to the means and manner of job performance. It is further pro-
vided that nothing shall preclude negotiations over a procedure for the resolution of griev-
ances.
10. Exec. Order No. 10,988, §§ 6(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. 521, 524 (1959-1963 Compilation) (re-
voked by Exec. Order 11,491, § 26, 3 C.F.R. 861, 875 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprintedin 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)) represented the first authoritative recognition of management's rights.
Section 7 required approval by the agency head or an official representative of all basic or
supplemental collective bargaining agreements. It also set out managerial prerogatives with
the same particularity expressed in § 7106(a)(2) of the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7106(a)(2) (Supp. 111978). Section 6(b) described the extent to which executive discretion
was to limit the scope of negotiations. Its pronouncements were similar to § 7106(a)(1) of
the Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 7 was rewritten as Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 15, 3 C.F.R.
861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976). The provisions of
Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 6(b) were incorporated into Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12, 3
C.F.R. 869-70. No subsequent executive order altered management's retained rights.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978), cited in full at note 9 supra.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14) (Supp. I 1978) defines "conditions of employment" as "per-
sonnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise,
affecting working conditions, except that such term does not include policies, practices and
matters-
(A) relating to political activities prohibited under subchapter III of Chapter 73 of this
title;
(B) relating to the classification of any position; or
(C) to the extent such matters are specifically provided for by Federal statute." Most
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restricts to working conditions.1
3
In the past, in addition to restrictions on what one may grieve cre-
ated by exclusive management rights, two further limitations served to
restrict access to a negotiated grievance procedure. First, unlike the
current practice in which a grievance resolution procedure is a
mandatory feature of collective bargaining, 14 a negotiated grievance
procedure was merely an alternative to agency procedures under Exec-
utive Order 10,988, issued in 1962. Under this policy, the grievant was
subject to a procedure unilaterally created and carried out by the
agency unless a grievance procedure was both negotiated through bar-
gaining and affirmatively selected in a particular dispute.15 The elimi-
nation of this "dual" grievance system in favor of the present "single"
system accounts in part for the increased accessibility and more final
and binding character of present federal grievance arbitration proce-
dures. 16 The second limitation on access to a negotiated grievance pro-
cedure occurred if a statutory appeals procedure existed for a particular
dispute. Such an appeals procedure precluded use of the negotiated
grievance procedure as a means of dispute resolution. 17 Although
many statutory appeals provisions existed,' 8 the primary exclusion
from the negotiated procedure was for adverse, or disciplinary, person-
nel actions. 19 Thus, during the early development of federal sector ar-
bitration, access to a negotiated procedure was restricted by exclusive
management rights, by the use of "dual" grievance systems, and by the
exclusion of matters subject to statutory appeal. These historical limi-
tations and union efforts to remove them are understood more readily
notable is the exclusion of matters relating to classification. See text accompanying notes
154-59 infra for a discussion of§ 7121 of the Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (Supp. 11 1978),
which erroneously appears to entitle grievants to arbitrate certain matters relating to classifi-
cation, although this subject is excluded from negotiations of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14) (Supp. 11 1978).
14. See id. § 7121(a)(1), which provides that "any collective bargaining agreement shall
provide procedures for the settlement of grievances," subject to exceptions.
15. For a discussion of union agitation in the years directly preceding the issuance of
Exec. Order No. 11,491, to limit grievance resolution to the negotiated procedure and thus to
terminate the "dual" system, see M. NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT SERVICE 257-58, 260-61 (1976).
16. Id. at 260-61.
17. See notes 152-53 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of appeal procedures
established by statute in the federal sector to provide an employee with a forum in which to
seek redress for certain alleged wrongs.
18. See notes 152-53 & accompanying text infra.
19. Under the Reform Act, adverse actions include a removal, a reduction in grade or
pay, a suspension for more than 14 days, or a furlough of less than 30 days. 5 U.S.C. § 7152
(Supp. I 1978).
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when the executive orders governing negotiated grievance procedures
are considered.
Executive Order 10,988
In 1961, President Kennedy appointed a Task Force on Employee-
Management Relations in the Federal Service both in recognition of
the strong need for a comprehensive government policy on federal sec-
tor labor-management relations and to prevent the enactment of un-
duly restrictive legislation.20 The Task Force's report recommended
the issuance of an executive order granting federal employees limited
bargaining rights.21 On January 17, 1962, President Kennedy issued
Executive Order 10,988, establishing the ground rules for labor-man-
agement cooperation in the federal sector.
22
Section 8 of the Executive Order provided for a negotiated griev-
ance procedure.23 Although section 8(a) provided that collective bar-
gaining agreements could contain provisions designating procedures
for the consideration of grievances, 24 the language did not require that
there be a negotiated procedure and thus nothing constrained resort to
agency procedures. Therefore, while Executive Order 10,988 was in
force, "dual" procedures existed for the consideration and resolution of
grievances.
In addition, section 8(b) of Executive Order 10,988 set forth the
limits of arbitration.25 First, arbitration could only be advisory; all de-
terminations of the arbitrator effectively were conditioned upon ap-
proval by the agency head. Second, arbitration could extend no further
than the interpretation or application of the collective bargaining
agreement or an agency policy, where the latter was incorporated into
20. For example, "the [Rhodes-Johnson] bill as it evolved contained some questionably
extreme positions, such as mandatoxy suspension, demotion, or removal for any administra-
tive official violating certain parts of the law, regardless of knowledge, intent, or other cir-
cumstances." Davies, Grievance Arbitration Within Department of the Army Under Executive
Order 10988, 46 MIL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1969).
21. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FED-
ERAL SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE (1961).
22. Davies, Grievance Arbitration Within Department of the Army Under Executive Or-
der 10988, 46 MIL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1969).
23. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 521, 525 (1959-1963 Compilation) (revoked
by Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 26, 3 C.F.R. 861, 875 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprintedin 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
24. Id. § 8(a).
25. Id. § 8(b).
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the agreement.26 The arbitrator was not permitted to alter or modify
the agreement. Moreover, arbitration could be invoked only by the in-
dividual employee or employees with grievances.27 Finally, section 14
of the Order provided that adverse actions could be appealed to the
Civil Service Commission if the decision of the administrative officer
was adverse to the interest of the employee.
28
Executive Order 11,491
The ensuing years of development under Executive Order 10,988
saw extensive union agitation aimed at eliminating agency procedures
by limiting grievance resolution solely to the negotiated procedure.
29
Although it fell short of union hopes,30 Executive Order 11,491 did
serve to strengthen arbitration as a means of grievance resolution. Sec-
tion 13 of the Order provided that the negotiated procedure would be
the exclusive procedure available to grievants when the bargaining
agreement so specified. 31 Once a grievance procedure had been negoti-
ated and had become a part of the agreement, the grievant could no
longer elect to utilize the agency procedure. In addition, Executive Or-
der 11,491 removed the requirement that arbitration be advisory; an
arbitration award was made final and binding subject to review by the
Federal Labor Relations Council.32
Despite these significant changes, Executive Order 11,491 retained
certain provisions of Executive Order 10,988; adverse actions continued
to be subject to a statutory appeals procedure,33 the negotiated proce-
26. For a discussion of circumstances under which an internal agency regulation may
be interpreted and applied by an arbitrator, see note 114 & accompanying text infra.
27. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 8(b), 3 C.F.R. 521, 525 (1959-1963 Compilation) (re-
voked by Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 26, 3 C.F.R. 861, 875 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)). Section 8(a) set out further limitations to which the negotiated
grievance procedure was subject: "Such procedures (1) shall conform to standards issued by
the Civil Service Commission, and (2) may not in any manner diminish or impair any rights
which would otherwise be available to any employee in the absence of an agreement provid-
ing for such procedures."
28. Id. § 14, at 527.
29. For a discussion of union efforts to terminate the exclusion of adverse actions from
the negotiated procedure, see M. NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT SERVICE 258 (1976).
30. See id. at 258-59, for a discussion of union efforts to attain universal, mandated,
final, and binding arbitration.
31. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13, 3 C.F.R. 861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
32. Id. § 14, at 870 (revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 605, 607 (1971-
1975 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
33. Id. § 22, at 874.
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dure still had to conform to Civil Service Commission requirements,
34
and, in the case of an employee grievance, arbitration could be invoked
only with the approval of the employee. A slight change was brought
about, however, insofar as all other grievances required only the ap-
proval of the exclusive union.
35
Executive Orders 11,616 and 11,838
Executive Order 11,616,36 issued in 1971, amended Executive Or-
der 11,491 while generally maintaining the policies instituted under
earlier orders. The "duar' system of negotiated agency grievance pro-
cedures remained the same, with the negotiated grievance procedure
still restricted to the resolution of disputes involving the interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement.37 In contrast to
Executive Order 11,491, Executive Order 11,616 specified that the ne-
gotiated grievance procedure would be the exclusive procedure for the
resolution of disputes over collective bargaining agreements, eliminat-
ing the requirement that the parties make that election in each case.
38
Executive Order 11,616 further amended Executive Order 11,491
to provide that, for the first time, grievance procedures were to be nego-
tiated entirely by the parties39 without being subject to Civil Service
Commission requirements. 4° Furthermore, whereas under Executive
Order 11,491 any union could represent an employee in the presenta-
tion of a grievance, 41 under Executive Order 11,616 the employee was
to be represented by the exclusive union or someone approved by the
34. Id. § 13, at 870.
35. Id. § 14, at 870. The exclusive union is that labor organization that has attained
exclusive recognition in keeping with the requirements of Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 7, 3
C.F.R. at 856-66, and has maintained the exclusive right of representation of employees in
any unit or subdivision of an agency.
36. Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 605 (1971-1975 Compilation) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
37. Id. § 8, at 607.
38. Compare Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13,3 C.F.R. 861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation),
where it is provided that the negotiated grievance procedure is "the exclusive procedure
available to employees in the unit when the agreement so provides," with Exec. Order No.
11,616, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 605, 606-07 (1971-1975 Compilation) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (1976)), where similar provision is made for exclusivity absent the qualification that
there be a provision in the collective bargaining agreement to that effect.
39. Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 605, 606-07 (1971-1975 Compilation) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
40. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 13, 3 C.F.R. 861, 870 (1966-1970 Compilation), amended
by Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 605, 606-07 (1971-1975 Compilation) (current ver-
sion at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
41. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 14, 3 C.F.R. 870 (revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,616,
§ 9, 3 C.F.R. 605, 607 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
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exclusive union, unless the employee chose to represent him or her-
self.42 Finally, Executive Order 11,616 expanded the role of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations to include
the determination of questions of arbitrability.
43
The policy of excluding matters from the negotiated procedure for
which a statutory appeals procedure existed remained under Executive
Order 11,616. Section 8(a) provided: "A negotiated grievance proce-
dure may not cover any other matters, including matters for which stat-
utory appeals procedures exist . . ... 44 Substantial confusion arose,
however, over the meaning of the phrase "any other matters." This
confusion was not erased until 1975 when Executive Order 11,83845
was issued, specifying simply that the negotiated grievance procedure
could not cover matters for which a statutory appeals procedure ex-
isted.46 In all other respects Executive Order 11,838 maintained the
policies of Executive Order 11,491. Not until 1979 did grievance arbi-
tration in the federal sector experience further change.
Arbitration Under the Executive Orders
In many respects federal sector arbitration does not differ appreci-
ably from arbitration in the private sector; the necessary qualities of an
arbitrator,47 arbitration procedures, standards of contract interpreta-
tion, and the precedential or authoritative value of arbitration awards
in both sectors are similar. The scope of the arbitrator's authority,
however, represents a feature unique to the federal sector. Although
the following discussion considers these aspects of arbitration solely in
terms of experience under the executive orders, the Reform Act makes
no changes affecting either arbitration procedures or contract interpre-
tation principles; hence the discussion is still relevant and current.
42. Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 605, 607 (1971-1975 Compilation) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
43. Id. This subdivision provides: "Questions that cannot be resolved by the parties as
to whether or not a grievance is on a matter subject to the grievance procedure in an existing
agreement, or is subject to arbitration under that agreement, may be referred to the Assistant
Secretary for decision."
44. Id.
45. Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1976).
46. Id. § 14, at 960-61.
47. See generaly F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 90-96 (3d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as ELKOURI].
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Qualities of the Arbitrator
An arbitrator need not represent any particular professional or ed-
ucational background. Although a legal background may be helpful, it
is not indispensable.4 On the other hand, the arbitrator must be im-
partial,49 of the highest integrity,50 and particularly responsive to the
dispute between the parties.51 At the arbitration level, the parties select
the arbitrator.5 2 Initially, upon request of the parties, a panel of sug-
gested arbitrators is submitted53 to the party representatives, from
which an arbitrator is selected.5 4 If the parties fail to agree on an arbi-
trator, a request for an additional panel may be made.
55
Arbitration Procedures and Techniques
Arbitration procedures and techniques in the federal sector also
are comparable to those in the private sector.56 Grievance processing
generally involves several stages prior to arbitration. Initially, redress
is sought at the lowest appropriate supervisory level.5 7 If redress is un-
availing there, the grievance normally proceeds to the second, formal
stage, where the grievant files a written grievance.58 Often the griev-
ance proceeds to a third or even a fourth stage, with review by progres-
48. Id. at 94-95.
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id. at 92-93.
51. Id. at 93-94.
52. For a general discussion of methods of selecting arbitrators in the private sector, see
id. at 87-90. See 29 C.F.R. § 1404.10 (1978). For a discussion of methods of selecting arbi-
trators in the federal sector through the Office of Arbitration Services, Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, see COMMITTEE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE, FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
93-94 (1976).
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1404.10(a) (1978); COMMITTEE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE FEDERAL SERVICE, FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 93 (1976).
54. COMMITTEE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, FEDERAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 93 (1976).
55. Id See 29 C.F.R. § 1404.12(c)(6) (1978).
56. For a general discussion of procedures and techniques as a prelude to arbitration in
the private sector, see ELKOURI, supra note 47, ch. 5. For a discussion of procedures and
techniques most often provided for in federal sector collective bargaining agreements, see
OFFICE OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NEGOTI-
ATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AND ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13-21
(1975).
57. OFFICE OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AND ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
13-14 (1975).
58. Id. at 14.
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sively higher levels of management. 59 If the grievant is still dissatisfied,
resort to arbitration will ensue.
Certain streamlining procedures are available to the parties prior
to the arbitration proceeding itself. For example, although the proce-
dure is rarely used the parties may request a preliminary conference
when the arbitrator faces a complex procedure or issue. 60 As another
alternative, a party may submit a preliminary brief if that party be-
lieves a brief would provide greater clarification than an opening state-
ment.61 On occasion, parties enter into a stipulation of facts.62 Finally,
although the grievance statement generally will identify the issue or
issues to be decided, the arbitrator may request a preliminary determi-
nation requiring the parties to set forth the issue or issues in writing.
63
Arbitration proceedings resemble a case at law. Generally, the
moving party presents its case first, although circumstances may de-
mand a reversal of this general practice. 64 The parties also may present
opening statements65 and closing arguments; 66 transcripts may be uti-
lized at the discretion of the arbitrator.67 In particularly complex cases,
the arbitrator may call for the submission of post-hearing briefs.
68 Just
as in default proceedings conducted in a case at law, an arbitration
proceeding may be conducted in the absence of a party if that party
received notice of the proceeding and had ample time to obtain an ad-
journment. In the event an ex parte proceeding should occur, the party
appearing nonetheless will be required to set forth its evidence and, if
appropriate, to sustain its burden of proof.
69
While procedures set forth by the collective bargaining agreement
or by stipulation of the parties are generally complied with, they have
been disregarded where their application would have placed form over
substance.70 Arbitrators recognize that the arbitration hearing is not a
59. Id. at 14-15.
60. COMMITTEE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, FEDERAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 94-95 (1976).





66. Id. at 96.
67. Id. Transcripts generally are used only when the issues are complex or procedural
difficulties are anticipated. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 97. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1404.14(c) (1978).
70. Hill Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1592, L.A.I.R.S.
10483, at 6 (1975) (Rentfro, Arb.). The L.A.I.R.S. number identifies reports of arbitration
awards on file in the United States Civil Service Commission's LABOR AGREEMENT INFOR-
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case at law and that therefore they are not bound by stringent procedu-
ral considerations; hence, for instance, a technically valid dismissal of a
case may be refused if dismissal of the case would leave the problem
unresolved. 71 Moreover, the arbitrator's jurisdiction, whether in the
private or federal sector, is strictly confined to the issues stipulated by
the parties or to the interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, as "[flrequently the arbitrator is forbidden to change or modify
the agreement."72 Labor arbitration awards have affirmed these limita-
tions. 73
Arbitration in the federal sector, while similar to private sector ar-
bitration in many ways, does differ in one important respect. The scope
of authority of the arbitrator is broader in the federal sector because the
arbitrator not only must interpret the provisions of the specific collec-
tive bargaining agreement under which the dispute arose, but must do
so in light of applicable federal laws and regulations.
74
In regard to the broader scope of authority of the federal arbitra-
tor, Henry B. Frazier III, former Executive Director of the Federal La-
bor Relations Council,75 stated that
MATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM (L.A.I.R.S.). A digest of the awards is available. OFFICE OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DIGEST OF LABOR
ARBITRATION AWARDS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE (1978).
71. Hill Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1592, L.A.I.R.S.
10483, at 6 (1975) (Rentfro, Arb.); see also Marine Corps Logistics Support Base v. Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2317, L.A.I.R.S. 10939, at 6 (1977) (Goodman, Arb.),
where Arbitrator Goodman found that "a technical application of the procedures should not
be permitted to deprive the Grievant, innocent in the procedural matter, of her right to have
her grievance processed fully." For a contrary view, see United States Army v. American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2197, L.A.I.R.S. 10335, at 8 (1975) (Grether, Arb.), where
Arbitrator Grether found: "However, procedural rights are important. The provisions of the
agreement which were not followed strictly in this instance undoubtedly were intended to
safeguard the union's rights and the employee's rights. To disregard them would invite the
undermining of the collective bargaining process as well as violate contractual rights."
72. OFFICE OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
NEGOTIATED GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AND ARBITRATION IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 33
(1975).
73. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv. v. National Treasury Employees Union, Local 10,
L.A.I.R.S. 10865, at 6 (1977) (Erbs, Arb.); Department of Labor v. American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, Local 12, L.A.LR.S. 10218, at 13 (1971) (Jaffee, Arb.).
74. Regulations in this context refers to both government-wide regulations and internal
agency regulations. See notes 113-14 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of the two
enumerated circumstances set forth in Federal Labor Relations Council decisions in which it
is within the scope of the arbitrator's authority to interpret internal agency regulations.
75. The Federal Labor Relations Council was charged, among other things, with the
power to review arbitration awards under the authority of Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 4, 3
C.F.R. 861, 864 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinled in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976). See note 106
& accompanying text infra.
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the Council has consistently stressed that an arbitrator considering a
grievance alleging a violation of a contract provision cannot consider
the pertinent agreement provision in a vacuum. That is, the arbitra-
tor's consideration of the matter can not be limited to the negotiated
agreement itself. He or she must turn to any provisions of statute
and regulations which govern the matter as well as the contract pro-
visions.
76
Frazier noted that if the arbitrator failed to consider properly applica-
ble laws or regulations the award would be more susceptible to being
overturned on review. In this respect, "final and binding" arbitration
would be undermined to as serious an extent as it is by the review ma-
chinery itself.77 Thus, while arbitrators may not modify collective bar-
gaining agreements, they have at their disposal the vast body of
applicable federal laws and regulations to aid in interpretation. Conse-
quently, the scope of the arbitrator's authority necessarily is expanded.
Standards of Contract Interpretation
Federal sector arbitration awards, which form the basis of an
emerging federal sector common law, provide a unique opportunity to
analyze the standards applied in interpreting contract language of bar-
gaining agreements. 78 While many of the standards applied in the in-
terpretation of labor contracts are substantially the same as those
applied in cases of general contract interpretation, the labor relations
context presents an area sufficiently specialized to generate unique the-
ories of interpretation. Furthermore, federal sector contract interpreta-
tion must expressly recognize the impact of management's retained
rights, 79 an element not present in the private sector.
Standards of interpretation of contract language are relevant only
if that language is ambiguous, necessitating the introduction of external
evidence to explain the meaning of the language. 80 Although contract
76. Address by Henry B. Frazier III, Conference on Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Sector 2 (1978) (unpublished address on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
77. Id. at 2-3.
78. Unfortunately, the L.A.I.R.S. file, discussed at note 70 supra, is not regularly acces-
sible, nor has it been indexed according to the varying standards for interpreting contract
language.
79. The specific rights reserved to management are codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1)
(Supp. I 1978), cited in full at note 9 supra.
80. Thus, where the contract language is unambiguous, the arbitrator will interpret it as
meaning what it clearly expresses. OFFICE OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 14 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION]. See Internal Revenue Serv. v. National
Treasury Employees Union, Local 97, L.A.I.R.S. 10208, at 5 (1974) (Seligson, Arb.); see also
Tooele Army Depot v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 226 1,
L.A.I.R.S. 10731 (1976) (Richardson, Arb.) (citing ELKOURI, supra note 47, at 204). In addi-
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language itself is regarded as the best indicator of the mutual intent of
the parties,8' in the face of an ambiguity 82 the arbitrator will seek to
reconstruct that intent on the basis of evidence not contained in the
agreement.83 Given the particular circumstances, the arbitrator will
apply a standard strongly linked to either labor relations or contract
law, or both.
In applying standards tied to labor relations, arbitrators refer first
to the record of negotiations or bargaining history between the parties,
then to the past practice of the parties, 4 and finally to the general prac-
tice in the agency. 85 The record of negotiations and the bargaining his-
tory are referred to initially, when available, because they are the most
specific representation of the parties' intent at the time of the negotia-
tion and consummation of the collective bargaining agreement. The
past practice of the parties and the general practice in the agency pro-
vide progressively less specific representations of intent. When there is
an ambiguity, bargaining history indicates not only what the drafters
intended, but in many cases what they did not intend; for example,
management may reject a union proposal of certain specific contract
language in the last negotiation between the parties.86 On the other
tion, arbitrators often resort to dictionary definitions in keeping with the bias toward the
contract language itself. See Norfolk Naval Shipyard v. Metal Trades Council, L.A.I.R.S.
10347 (1975) (Jones, Arb.); Internal Revenue Serv. v. National Treasury Employees Union,
Local 12, L.A.I.R.S. 10182 (1973) (Seitz, Arb.). Contra, Quonset Point Naval Air Station v.
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local 7, L.A.I.R.S. 20253 (1970) (McConnell, Arb.),
cited in GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, .supra, at 15, where the arbitrator found that the parties,
through negotiation, should agree as to what would constitute "reasonable" or "necessary
time" and "appropriate" union business as opposed to having the arbitrator fix that mean-
ing.
81. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 15-16 (citing United States Air Force-
Warner Robins Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 987,
L.A.I.R.S. 10224, at 49 (1974) (Mathews, Arb.)). See generally Marine Corps Recruit Depot
v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 429, L.A.I.R.S. 10183 (1974) (King, Arb.);
Naval Supply Center v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 97, L.A.I.R.S. 10213 (1971)
(Cantor, Arb.).
82. In one case, Arbitrator Adolph M. Koven concluded that certain provisions of the
agreement in question were ambiguous "since they [could] reasonably be read in the manner
contended for by both parties." Internal Revenue Serv. v. National Treasury Employees
Union, Local 20, L.A.I.R.S. 10654, at 9 (1976) (Koven, Arb.).
83. After a finding of ambiguity has been made, "evidence of the surrounding circum-
stances and the practical construction of the parties is admissible to aid in its interpretation."
United States Air Force-Warner Robins Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees, Local 987, L.A.I.R.S. 10224, at 48 (1974) (Mathews, Arb.).
84. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 16-19.
85. See generally Social Security Administration v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees, Local 1923, L.A.I.R.S. 10703, at 9 (1976) (G'amser, Arb.).
86. See GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 16 (citing Government Printing
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hand, the union may make a particular proposal at the outset of negoti-
ations, but fail to revive it as negotiations proceed, leading to the con-
clusion that the union did not intend that it be implemented.
7
Past practice helps to explain ambiguous contract language by re-
ferring the arbitrator to the history of the daily operations of the parties
under a prior collective bargaining agreement or series of agreements.
88
Generally, a past practice is a practice in which both parties have con-
curred and which they tacitly have assumed would continue through
the life of the contract.89 Although a binding past practice may have
been established, changed circumstances may dissipate the underlying
purpose of the practice, rendering it unenforceable. 90 A past practice
thus must encompass the same basis or need that led to its establish-
ment to remain binding.91 Finally, if the past practice of the parties
fails to clarify the ambiguous language, the practices of the particular
agency (industry) may be considered for the purpose of interpreta-
tion. 9
2
Arbitrators also may apply two subsidiary standards that are simi-
larly tied to the labor relations context. First, contract interpretation by
necessity is subject to the retained rights of management. Typically,
conflicts over management rights arise over the interpretation of the
terms of the agreement relating to work assignment. 93 In this context,
Office v. International Typographic Union, Local 101, L.A.I.R.S. 10096, at 6-7 (1973) (Jaf-
fee, Arb.)).
87. United States Navy v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1482, L.A.I.R.S.
10169, at 7 (1973) (Roberts, Arb.), citedin GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 17.
See also Naval Ordnance Stations v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 830,
L.A.I.R.S. 10078 (1975) (Duffey, Arb.).
88. See generaly Internal Revenue Serv. v. National Treasury Employees Union, Lo-
cal 97, L.A.I.R.S. 10474 (1975) (Ward, Arb.).
89. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard v. Honolulu Metal Trades Council, L.A.I.R.S. 10297,
at 5 (1971) (Tinning, Arb.); see also Navy Public Works Center v. International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 192, L.A.I.R.S. 10784 (1976) (Morgan, Arb.); Mc-
Clellan Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1857, L.A.I.R.S.
10788 (1976) (Staudohar, Arb.); Federal Aviation Administration v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Org., L.A.I.R.S. 10023 (1974) (Gross, Arb.).
90. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 18.
91. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons and Fed. Prison Indus. v. American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1145, L.A.I.R.S. 10227, at 9 (1975) (Dallas, Arb.). Arbitra-
tor Dallas found that the agency had not violated the agreement when it failed to provide
refrigerators after a remodeling of its facilities, because in remodeling, air conditioning was
intalled, changing the conditions that necessitated the refrigeration. For further discussion
of this award, see GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 18.
92. United States Air Force-Warner Robins Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 987, L.A.I.R.S. 10224, at 49 (1974) (Mathews, Arb.).
93. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Administration v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Org., L.A.I.R.S. 10852 (1976) (Dykstra, Arb.); Federal Aviation Administration v. Profes-
although cases generally have found that work assignments must rea-
sonably relate to the employee's primary function,94 arbitrators hold
strongly to the language of the agreement to the extent that such a rigid
interpretation will not defeat management's need for efficient opera-
tion.95 Second, arbitrators readily reject "any move by either of the
parties to gain through arbitration an objective not achieved in negotia-
tions."' 96 Arbitrators have found that modifying or supplementing the
collective bargaining agreement is not within their authority and that
the parties should resolve these sorts of differences through negotia-
tions.97
Contract interpretation in the labor relations context also incorpo-
rates the standards of interpretation applied in contract law. Gener-
ally, arbitrators have found that the language of the contract should be
construed more harshly against the maker.98 In one case, the arbitrator
noted that "[i]t is a fixed rule of interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements that a party who proffers language has the burden of ex-
plaining any unusual meaning which it assigns to this language." 99 Ar-
bitrators also have found that agreements are to be construed as a
whole if the purpose and substance of a particular provision is to bc
sional Air Traffic Controllers Org., L.A.I.R.S. 10817 (1976) (Lennard, Arb.); Federal Avia
tion Administration v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., L.A.I.R.S. 10745 (1976
(Sabella, Arb.); Federal Aviation Administration v. Professional Air Traffic Controller
Org., L.A.I.R.S. 10594 (1976) (Eigenbrod, Arb.). For a discussion of these awards, set
GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 11.
94. See, e.g., Charleston Naval Shipyard v. Metal Trades Council, L.A.I.R.S. 1015:
(1975) (Lynch, Arb.); Department of Transp. v. National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialist,
L.A.I.R.S. 10147 (1974) (Kindig, Arb.); Social Security Administration v. American Fed'n o
Gov't Employees, L.A.I.R.S. 10150 (1972) (Trotta, Arb.). For additional discussion, seA
GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 11-12.
95. Charleston Naval Shipyard v. Metal Trades Council, L.A.I.R.S. 10153, at 13 (1975
(Lynch, Arb.). Arbitrator Lynch noted, however, that "proper consideration should bc
given to the rights and privileges of the individuals involved." Id.
96. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 12 (citing Naval Air Rework Facilit3
v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 39, L.A.I.R.S. 10401
(1975) (Ables, Arb.)). See also Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare v. American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees, Local 1164, L.A.I.R.S. 10316 (1974) (McCloskey, Arb.); Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard v. Metal Trades Council, L.A.LR.S. 10187 (1971) (Campbell, Arb.). For a
discussion of the policy reflected in these awards, see GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note
80, at 12-13.
97. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 12-13.
98. See, e.g., United States Air Force-Warner Robins Air Force Base v. American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 987, L.A.I.R.S. 10224, at 53 (1974) (Mathews, Arb.).
99. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local
1138, L.A.I.R.S. 10194, at 6 (1974) (Slain, Arb.). -For a discussion of this award, see GRIEV-
ANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 21.
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understood °° and inequity avoided. Further, management decisions
in matters involving application of agreement language or regulations
frequently are overturned on the ground of lax enforcement and ineq-
uity. 0 1 This inconsistency in application acts as a waiver and estops
management from applying either the agreement language or the regu-
lations. One case pointed out, however, that an agency nonetheless
might return to its original application upon notifying the employees of
its intent to do so; but thereafter the agency must apply equal standards
to avoid having its decisions overturned in arbitration once again.
10 2
Furthermore, arbitrators generally will overlook violations of or depar-
tures from the agreement regarded as "de minimis"' 10 3 or which oc-
curred to avoid a forfeiture. 104
As the body of arbitration awards grows larger, further standards
of interpretation most probably will be adopted. In the meantime, the
standards operate as the basis for contract interpretation in federal sec-
tor grievance arbitration.
The Precedential Value of Arbitration A wards
Once an arbitration award has been issued, it may or may not in-
fluence subsequent awards. In the federal sector, as in the private sec-
tor, labor arbitration awards do not have the same binding effect as
legal decisions. Generally, arbitrators in the federal sector accord vary-
ing weight to previous awards, according greater weight when there is a
close relationship of issues. 105 The increased accessibility to arbitration
brought about by the Reform Act should serve to expand the existing
100. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv. v. National Treasury Employees Union, Local 12,
L.A.I.R.S. 10182, at 4 (1973) (Seitz, Arb.).
101. Federal Aviation Administration v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.,
L.A.I.R.S. 10023, at 11 (1974) (Gross, Arb.). For further discussion of this case, see GRIEV-
ANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 13.
102. Federal Aviation Administration v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.,
L.A.I.R.S. 10023, at 11 (1974) (Gross, Arb.). For a synopsis of the award, see GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 13.
103. See, e.g., United States Navy-Charleston Naval Shipyard v. Metal Trades Coun-
cil, L.A.I.R.S. 10162 (1974) (Mathews, Arb.); United States Army-Aberdeen Proving
Ground v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 2424, L.A.I.R.S. 10209 (1973) (Harkless,
Arb.); Naval Air Rework Facility v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Work-
ers, Local 39, L.A.I.R.S. 20286 (1971) (Memory, Arb.).
104. See, e.g., Naval Ordnance Station v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, Local 830, L.A.I.R.S. 20097 (1974) (Beckman, Arb.). In this case Arbitrator Beck-
man found "that a party would quickly lose faith in its negotiated system of resolving dis-
putes if that system itself was responsible for forfeiting the right of a grievant to a full and
fair presentation of his grievance .. " GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION, supra note 80, at 19-20.
105. See, e.g., Department of Treasury v. National Treasury Employees Union,
L.A.I.R.S. 10306 (1975) (White, Arb.). For an analysis of federal sector practice, see GRIEV-
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body of law. As these decisions become better known to federal arbi-
trators, an increased reliance upon prior awards may be anticipated.
As any award turns upon the particular provision of the agreement in
question, however, perhaps arbitration awards will never provide bind-
ing precedent in the same fashion as do legal decisions. Rather, arbi-
trators may well continue to let fairness be their guide.
Administrative Review
The Federal Labor Relations Council, established pursuant to sec-
tion 4 of Executive Order 11,491, was empowered to review arbitration
awards under certain limited circumstances. 10 6 Section 2411.32 of the
Council's rules of procedure outlined in general terms the grounds for
granting a petition for review: "The Council will grant a petition for
review of an arbitration award only where it appears . ..that the
award violates applicable law, appropriate regulation, or the order, or
other grounds similar to those upon which challenges to arbitration
awards are sustained by courts in private sector labor-management re-
lations." 0
7
The practical bases for granting or denying petitions for review are
set out in the considerable body of Council decisions. These decisions
have been analyzed in a comprehensive article by Henry B. Frazier III,
entitled Labor Arbitration in the Federal Service.10 8 Frazier noted that
generally where a petition for review was granted on the ground that
the award violated applicable law, either "a statute preclude[d] relief
granted by the award or. . .a statutory condition precedent to such
relief [was not] met."' 0 9 He further noted that section 12 of Executive
Order 11,491, which sets out mandatory requirements for collective
bargaining agreements, was usually at issue on appeals arguing a viola-
ANcE ARBrrRATiON, supra note 80, at 18. For a discussion of the precedential value of
awards in the private sector, see ELKOURI, supra note 47, at 365-88.
106. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 864 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1976). The role of the Council was to administer and interpret Executive
Order 11,491, to decide major policy issues (important questions of general application in
the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program), and to provide overall program direc-
tion. In its reviewing capacity, the Council not only considered exceptions to grievance arbi-
tration awards, but also considered appeals from agency decisions on the negotiability of a
specific issue and appeals of decisions, including those on arbitrability, of the Assistant Sec-
retary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations. The Council has been superseded by the
Federal Labor Relations Authority as provided in 5 U.S.C. § 7122 (Supp. 111978).
107. 5 C.F.R. § 2411.32 (1978) (Administrative Personnel).
108. Frazier, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Service, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 712
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Frazier]. Frazier was serving as Executive Director of the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Council at the time he wrote his article.
109. Id. at 721-22. For an illustration, see case cited id. at 722 n.56.
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tion of an order. 110
The Council's rules provided that an award could not violate ap-
propriate regulation. There was, however, some confusion over what
constituted an "appropriate regulation." Civil Service Commission
regulations undoubtedly were "appropriate regulations";"' the Coun-
cil had so held." 2 The Council never held, however, that an internal
agency regulation' 13 was an "appropriate regulation" within the mean-
ing of the Council's rules, although the issue was presented in two
Council cases.' 
14
The Council's rules further provided that a petition for review
could be granted on "grounds similar to those upon which challenges
to arbitration awards are sustained by courts in private sector labor-
management relations."' '15 Frazier stated that the Council recognized
six such grounds for granting review. 116 First, review would be granted
when the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority' 17 by deciding an is-
sue not submitted to arbitration." 8 If an award extended to all matters
necessarily arising from issues included in the question submitted," 19
110. Id. at 733. See Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12, 3 C.F.R. 861, 869-70 (1966-1970
Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976). The most important of these require-
ments was management's retained rights. Frazier, supra note 108, at 734.
111. Frazier, supra note 108, at 726.
112. Id. An illustrative case is cited at id. at 726 n.96.
113. Frazier defines "internal agency regulations" as "regulations issued by an agency
for application only within that agency .... " Id. at 730.
114. Frazier points out that in Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Trans-
portation, Rep. No. 78, F.L.R.C. No. 74A-88 (1975) (Schedler, Arb.), the Council held that
"when an agency agrees, during contract negotiations, to incorporate in the contract an
agency policy or regulation concerning a matter within agency discretion, the agency
thereby agrees to allow the union to use contract grievance procedures to dispute the
agency's interpretation and application of the policy or regulation." Frazier, supra note 108,
at 730-31. In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2616 (Griffiss Air
Force Base), Rep. No. 94, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-45 (1976) (Gross, Arb.), the Council held:
"While it is recognized that under section 12(a) of the Order an agency's regulations are
binding in the administration of a negotiated agreement, the Council is of the opinion that
where, as in this case, an arbitrator, in the course of rendering his award, considers an
agency regulation which deals with the same subject matter as the provision in the negoti-
ated agreement and which was introduced by the parties to the dispute, and thereafter con-
siders and applies that regulation in reaching his judgment in the case, the agency may not
challenge the application of that regulation before the Council." Id. at 828 (footnotes omit-
ted). For a discussion of this decision, see Frazier, supra note 108, at 731-32.
115. 5 C.F.R. § 2411.32 (1978) (Administrative Personnel).
116. Frazier, supra note 108, at 739.
117. See id. at 739-43 for a discussion of this ground for review.
118. Id. at 739-40 (citing American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local, 12 Rep. No. 42,
F.L.R.C. No. 72A-3, at 6 (1973) (Jaffee, Arb.)).
119. Frazier, supra note 108, at 739-42.
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however, or if an imprecise issue had been submitted for arbitration,
1 20
the arbitrator would not have exceeded his or her authority in passing
on the dispute as long as the issue was within the confines of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.' 2l Second, review would be granted when
"the award [did] not draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement."'122 In this regard, the Council stated that it would uphold
an award unless, by way of either gross error or utter irrationality, the
award evidenced "'a manifest disregard of the agreement,' or on its
face represent[ed] an implausible interpretation thereof."'' 2 3 Third, the
Council would grant review if "the award [was] incomplete, ambigu-
ous, or contradictory, making implementation of the award impossi-
ble."1 24 Fourth, review would be granted if "the award [was] based on
a nonfact."' 25 Fifth, the Council could grant review if "the arbitrator
was biased or partial."' 26 Sixth, although the Council never did so,'2 7
it stated it would grant review where an "arbitrator refused to hear
pertinent and material evidence."'
128
These standards of review, particularly those based upon private
sector standards, reflect the Council's intention to restrict dispute reso-
lution to the arbitration process by generally rejecting petitions for re-
view absent exceptional circumstances. To this extent arbitration
awards are in fact "final and binding."
Under the executive orders there existed one further avenue of ap-
peal in matters involving the disbursement of government funds. The
Office of the Comptroller Genera' 2 9 is charged "with assuring that
public funds [were] disbursed in accordance with law"'130 and is "em-
120. Id. at 739, 740-41 (citing Pacific Southwest Forest, Rep. No. 101, F.L.R.C. No.
75A-4 (1976) (Myers, Arb.)).
121. Frazier, supra note 108, at 742.
122. Id. at 739; this second situation is discussed at id. at 743-45.
123. Id. at 743 (citing NAGE Local R8-14, Rep. No. 79, F.L.R.C. No. 74A-38, at 6
(1975) (Stratton, Arb.)).
124. Frazier, supra note 108, at 739, 745-46 (citing National Weather Service, N.O.A.A.,
United States Department of Commerce, Rep. No. 82, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-63 (1975)
(Strongin, Arb.), which illustrated "the aversion of the courts and the Council to reviewing
awards absent an egregious arbitral decision").
125. Frazier, supra note 108, at 739, 746-47.
126. Id. at 739, 747-48.
127. Id. at 739, 748-49.
128. Frazier took note of a private sector court decision granting review upon a finding
that a party had been deprived of a fair hearing. Id. at 748-49 (citing Harvey Aluminum v.
United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 493 (C.D. Cal. 1967)).
129. The Office of the Comptroller General operates as the head of the General Ac-
counting Office and is independent of the executive branch. 31 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
130. Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Service: How Final and Binding?, 51
ORE. L. REV. 134, 146 (1971).
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powered to issue decisions on legal questions asked by agency disburs-
ing officers as well as to audit their accounts."' 3' In past practice,
arbitration awards of back pay could be appealed to the Comptroller
General on the ground that a disbursement of public funds was re-
quired. The Office of the Comptroller General thus placed an addi-
tional limitation on the extent to which arbitration awards under the
executive orders actually were final and binding.
Judicial Review
Judicial review of actions arising under the executive orders tradi-
tionally was denied on the ground that there was no statutory basis for
finding federal question subject matter jurisdiction.132 In Manhattan-
Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski 33 the court of appeals stated: "Execu-
tive Order 10,988 does not, in its recitals, refer to any statute other than
the Act of March 3, 1871, 5 U.S.C. § 631,'134 which empowered the
President to regulate the conduct of employees in the executive
branch. 35 The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case
because Executive Order 10,988 "had no specific foundation in Con-
gressional action, nor was it required to effectuate any statute."'
36
Thus, an executive order did not constitute a law of the United States
within the meaning of the federal jurisdictional statute.
37
Judicial review was granted, however, by the district court in Na-
tional Broiler Council, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Council.138 The
case arose under Executive Order 11,491 and challenged a determina-
tion by the Council.1 39 Here, a federal district court found that al-
though the Council was created by Executive Order 11,491 it was an
"agency" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) 140 and therefore a
Council decision was subject to review as a "final agency action"
131. Id.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 133 l(a) (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy ... arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws or treaties of the United States."
133. 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
134. Former 5 U.S.C. § 631 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301(l)-(3), 7301 (1976)).
135. 350 F.2d at 452.
136. Id. at 456.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). See also Local 1498, American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 522 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1975); Stevens v.
Carey, 483 F.2d 188, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing with approval Manhattan-Bronx Postal
Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966)).
138. 382 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Va. 1974).
139. A Council determination, the last step of administrative review, was regarded as
constituting final agency action.
140. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1976) provides that "'agency' means each authority of the
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within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.141
Judicial review has always been available, even absent final
agency action, for claims arising under the Constitution. In National
Association of Government Employees v. White, 142 the union brought an
action alleging interference with its right to assemble, to speak freely, to
petition Congress, and to due process.1 43 While the court recognized
that a federal employee's right to organize, as set forth in Executive
Order 10,988, was capable of revocation by the executive, it held that
the power of revocation could not be exercised in a manner conflicting
with basic constitutional safeguards. 144 Thus, judicial relief could be
obtained even where no statutory basis for the action existed.
1 45
The limitations on access to both administrative and judicial re-
view have operated to confine such access to circumstances in which
fundamental notions of justice have been offended. The standards of
review of the Council were a product of a controlled judicial evolution
that emphasized the need to preserve the final and binding nature of
arbitration awards. The bases for judicial review were not exceptional,
reserving the remedy for instances in which independent grounds of
subject matter jurisdiction existed. Thus, because review of any sort
limits the extent to which arbitration is final and binding, there has
been a general recognition that absent exceptional circumstances the
arbitrator's award should not be disturbed.
Government of the United States,, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency ...."
141. 382 F. Supp. at 325. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976) provides: "Agency action made review-
able by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency ac-
tion or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency
action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined
an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for
an appeal to superior agency authority."
142. 418 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
143. The due process allegation attacked the vagueness of a provision of the Code of
Fair Labor Practices. Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and Code of Fair
Labor Practices, 3 C.F.R. 848 (1959-1963 Compilation), was promulgated by the President
to implement Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Compilation) (current ver-
sion at Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 18, 3 C.F.R. 861, 871-72 (1966-1970 Compilation), re-
printedin 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)).
144. 418 F.2d at 1130.
145. Id.
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The Reform Act
The Reform Act makes significant advances in the field of federal
sector labor-management relations, dramatically increasing both the
potential grievant's access to arbitration, the scope of arbitrable issues,
and the extent to which the arbitrator's award is truly "final and bind-
ing." Incorporated within these advances are two essential characteris-
tics of grievance procedures negotiated under the executive orders.
First, the negotiated grievance procedure remains the exclusive forum
on matters covered by the bargaining agreement, 146 and second, bind-
ing arbitration still may be invoked by either the exclusive representa-
tive or the agency. 147 But the Reform Act is not free from flaws. For
example, certain omissions render uncertain the extent to which partic-
ular practices which occurred under the executive orders will be main-
tained. 148 In addition, the question of whether an internal agency
regulation is an "appropriate regulation" for the purposes of overturn-
ing an arbitrator's award on appeal remains unanswered. 49 Finally,
the Reform Act would appear to create a loophole by permitting par-
ties to arbitrate a particular matter that they may not bargain, contrary
to the basic principle that one may grieve only what one may bar-
gain. 150
As stated previously, the scope of the negotiated grievance proce-
dure under the executive orders was subject to two mandatory exclu-
sions: management's retained rights could neither be bargained nor
arbitrated 15' and matters for which a statutory appeals procedure ex-
isted could not be arbitrated. 152 Management's retained rights remain
outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement and thus con-
tinue not to be subject to arbitration. The Reform Act, however, has
reduced to five the number of matters for which a statutory appeals
procedure exists, thus greatly eroding the scope of that formerly broad
146. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
147. Id. § 7121(b)(3)(C).
148. See text accompanying note 167 infra.
149. For a discussion of what constitutes an "appropriate regulation" within the mean-
ing of the Council's rules, see notes 111-14 & accompanying text supra.
150. For a discussion of the limitation which restricts the arbitrator to the interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement, see text accompanying notes 72-73
supra.
15 1. For a discussion of the exclusion of management's retained rights, see notes 9-11 &
accompanying text supra. 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (Supp. 11 1978) sets out those rights specifically
reserved to management and is cited in part at note 9 supra.
152. For a discussion of statutory appeals procedures see notes 17-18 & accompanying
text supra.
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exclusion while broadening the scope of arbitrable issues.15 3 Moreover,
under the executive orders a grievant could grieve only what had been
expressly bargained for.15 4 Under the Reform Act the parties must ex-
clude all issues not to be grieved.15 5 The presumption, therefore, has
been reversed, presuming all matters included within the negotiated
procedure, rather than excluded. Finally, whereas under Executive Or-
der 11,616 the role of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Man-
agement Relations was expanded to include the determination of
questions of arbitrability,15 6 the Reform Act appears to leave these de-
terminations to the arbitrator.
15 7
Despite the greater access to arbitration available to grievants
under the Reform Act, the new legislation apparently may have af-
forded a grievant one subject of arbitration excluded from bargaining.
As noted, the parties to a collective bargaining agreement may negoti-
ate only "conditions of employment."'' 58 Conditions of employment
are defined to include working conditions, but expressly exclude mat-
ters "relating to the classification of any position.' 59 Matters relating
to classification accordingly should be excluded from arbitration, as
153. Section 7121(c) of the Reform Act provides that negotiated grievance procedures
shall not apply to "(1) any claimed violation of subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title
(relating to prohibited political activities);
(2) retirement, life insurance, or health insurance;
(3) a suspension or removal under section 7532 of this title;
(4) any examination, certification, or appointment; or
(5) the classification of any position which does not result in the reduction in grade or
pay of an employee." 5 U.S.C. § 7121(c) (Supp. If 1978).
154. After Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 605, 606-07 (1971-1975 Compilation)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)), removed the requirement that the negotiated
grievance procedure be subject to Civil Service Commission requirements, the scope of the
grievance procedure was subject to negotiation by the parties. It therefore was incumbent
upon them to bargain in those matters they wished to be within the scope of the negotiated
procedure, subject to the mandatory exclusions, of course. See notes 39-40 & accompanying
text supra.
155. Section 7121(a)(2) of the Reform Act provides: "Any collective bargaining agree-
ment may exclude any matter from the application of the grievance procedures which are
provided for in the agreement." 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). The legislative his-
tory of § 7121 makes clear Congress' intent: "All matters that under the provisions of law
could be submitted to the grievance procedures shall in fact be within the scope of any
grievance procedure negotiated by the parties unless the parties agree as a part of the collec-
tive bargaining process that certain matters shall not be covered by the grievance proce-
dures." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1717,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 157, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2860, 2891.
156. Exec. Order No. 11,616 § 8, 3 C.F.R. 605, 607 (1971-1975 Compilation) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1976)). See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
158. Id. § 7103(a)(14). See note 12 & accompanying text SU ra.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14)(B) (Supp. 11 1978).
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one may grieve only what one may bargain. Surprisingly, however, the
express exclusions from the negotiated grievance procedure set forth in
section 7121160 merely exclude "the classification of any position which
does not result in the reduction in grade or pay of an employee."'16 1 As
this particular exclusion is drawn in such narrow terms, it appears that
a grievant may grieve other matters which relate to classification, thus
obtaining through arbitration what may not be gained through bar-
gaining.
The Reform Act should be amended to preclude the arbitrator
from making any determinations on matters relating to classification.
Historically, the Classification Act162 has been administered by the
Civil Service Commission. 163 With the enactment of the Reform Act,
and with the changes made under its authority, the task of classifying
positions will now fall on the Office of Personnel Management. Prefer-
ably, the problem of classification should be left to the exclusive discre-
tion of the government, as arbitrators have no experience, background,
or knowledge to enable them to cope with a matter of such complexity.
Thus, section 7121164 should be amended to exclude all matters relating
to classification.
Scope of Review Under the Reform Act
The scope of administrative review which existed under the execu-
tive orders has not been changed by the Reform Act. In fact, the Re-
form Act incorporates practically to the word the standards of review
contained in the Council's rules.' 65 The sole difference is that the
Council is now known as the Federal Labor Relations Authority.
166
The Reform Act appears, however, to have removed one existing
160. See note 153 & accompanying text supra.
161. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(c)(5) (Supp. I 1978) (emphasis added).
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1976).
163. Id. § 5112.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 7121(c)(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
165. Id. § 7122(a) provides: "Either party to arbitration under this chapter may file with
the authority an exception to any arbitrator's award pursuant to the arbitration (other than
an award relating to a matter described in section 7121(f) of this title). If upon review the
authority finds that the award is deficient-
(1) because it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation; or
(2) on other grounds similar to those applied by Federal courts in private sector labor-
management relations;
the authority may take such action and make such recommendations concerning the
award as it considers necessary, consistent with applicable laws, rules, or regulations."
Compare the Council's standards of review cited in the text accompanying note 107 supra.
166. For a discussion of the scope of administrative review under the Council, see notes
106-28 & accompanying text supra.
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avenue of appeal in that no mention is made of the Comptroller Gen-
eral. The absence is interesting in view of the Comptroller General's
significant role under the executive orders. The Reform Act does not
prescribe any role for the Comptroller General but, insofar as section
7122(b) 167 provides that an arbitration award may include the payment
of back pay and that such an award will be final and binding, it must
be presumed that Congress intended to preclude the Comptroller Gen-
eral from reviewing arbitration awards pursuant to its former capacity
under the executive orders. The exclusion of the Comptroller General
is significant in two ways. First, the exclusion reflects Congress' under-
standing that in disciplinary actions subject to arbitration, an award of
back pay follows necessarily from the determination that the grievant is
to be reinstated. Second, and more importantly, Congress has recog-
nized the importance of minimizing the occasions when the arbitrator's
award should be subject to review, thus bolstering the extent to which
an arbitration award is in fact final and binding.
Unresolved is the question of whether an internal agency regula-
tion is an "appropriate regulation," which if violated would be a basis
for upsetting an arbitration award. Although under the executive or-
ders the Council never so ruled, 168 the opportunity for such a ruling
was built into the language of the Council's rules.169 Under the Reform
Act, review may be granted where the award appears to be contrary to
"any. . . regulation."' 70 The context of the statement in the Reform
Act appears, however, to restrict application of this ground of review to
those regulations that previously were designated "appropriate." Thus,
apparently, the violation of no regulations other than Civil Service
Commission regulations may overturn an arbitration award.
Added perspective on this question may be gained by comparing
the impact of internal agency regulations on the negotiation and arbi-
tration processes.' 71 Section 7117 of the Reform Act sets forth the duty
to bargain in good faith, 72 providing initially that the duty shall not be
167. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
168. See notes 111-14 & accompanying text supra.
169. See note 107 & accompanying text supra.
170. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978), cited in full at note 165 supra.
171. See Frazier, supra note 108, at 732-33.
172. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a) (Supp. 11 1978) provides:
"(1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the duty to bargain in good faith
shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or
regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule
or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation.
(2) The duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any
Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation extend to matters which are the
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imposed when inconsistent with either federal law or government-wide
rules or regulations. 173 The duty to bargain in good faith does extend,
however, to internal agency regulations unless there exists a compelling
need for such regulation.174 Thus, absent a determination by the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority that a compelling need exists to pre-
clude a certain internal agency regulation from the negotiation process,
that regulation may become not only a subject of negotiation but also a
subject of arbitration. Consequently, federal law, government-wide
rules and regulations, and internal agency regulations for which there
exists a compelling need all operate to limit the duty to bargain in good
faith and the scope of the matters subject to negotiation. On the other
hand, the Reform Act provides that only a violation of federal law or
government-wide regulation is a ground for review of an arbitration
award. 175 To harmonize the negotiation and arbitration processes, in-
ternal agency regulations for which a compelling need exists should be
included within the larger category of regulations, the violation of
which may present a ground for review. Consistency between the two
processes would no doubt aid the administration of the Reform Act.
Moreover, adoption of this proposal by the Federal Labor Relations
Authority would greatly simplify the labor relations system. Not only
could one grieve, and hence arbitrate, only what one could bargain, but
a matter not the subject of both negotiation and arbitration could not
upset an arbitrator's award absent consideration of the judicially devel-
oped standards of review set forth in the Reform Act. 176 In this way,
the negotiation and arbitration processes would be harmonized.
Judicial Review
Under the Reform Act, judicial review of an arbitration award is
subject of any agency rule or regulation referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection only if
the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need
(as determined under regulations prescribed by the Authority) exists for the rule or regula-
tion.
(3) Paragraph (2) of the subsection applies to any rule or regulation issued by any
agency or issued by any primary national subdivision of such agency ..
173. Id. § 7117(a)(1).
174. Id. § 7117(a)(2).
175. See note 165 supra.
176. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(2) (Supp. II1978).
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strictly limited. 77 Final orders of the Federal Labor Relations Author-
ity (involving an appeal of an arbitration award) are not reviewable
unless the order involves an unfair labor practice.17  No statutory basis
is provided for review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a),
which establishes the rule for federal question subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, if a grievant seeks judicial review on the basis of a
wrong arising from a final adverse disposition of an arbitration award,
a constitutional question must be presented. 79 The Reform Act thus
reflects the current policy in federal sector labor-management relations
of restricting determinations in dispute resolution to a neutral third
party and balances the need for universal, mandated, final, and binding
arbitration against the right to a fair adjudication of a grievance.
Conclusion
Federal sector grievance arbitration is a familiar character on an
unfamiliar stage. To a large extent, the qualities desired of an arbitra-
tor, arbitration procedures, standards of contract interpretation, the
precedential or authoritative value accorded arbitration awards, and
the mode of review in the federal sector directly reflect like practices in
the private and public state and local sectors. Certain other features,
however, are unique to federal sector grievance arbitration. Such fea-
tures include statutory limitations on bargaining, which correspond-
ingly restrict arbitration, and the role of federal regulations, which
expand the scope of the arbitrator's authority and potentially undercut
the extent to which the arbitration award in fact will be final and bind-
ing.
Federal sector grievance arbitration has developed considerably in
recent years, not only in securing for grievants a dramatically increased
access to arbitration, but by establishing arbitration proceedings lead-
ing to an award that approximates universal, mandated, final and bind-
ing arbitration. As labor-management relations in the federal sector
mature, it will become clearer whether the Reform Act represents a
"perfect order" or whether further inroads will-or should-be made
177. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (Supp. 11 1978) provides: "Any person aggrieved by any final
order of the Authority other than an order under-
(1) section 7122 of this title (involving an award by an arbitrator), unless the order
involves an unfair labor practice under section 7118 of this title, or
(2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate unit determination), may...
institute an action for judicial review .
178. Id. § 7123(a)(1).
179. For a discussion of judicial review under the executive orders see notes 132-45 &
accompanying text supra.
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by labor as, for example, in the erosion of management's retained
rights. Until such time as practice under the Reform Act can be evalu-
ated meaningfully, however, we are left with its bare provisions and the
past practice of grievance arbitration under the executive orders to
serve as aids in improving current federal sector labor-management re-
lations.
